Shanahan's eloquently argued version of the global workspace theory fits well into the emerging understanding of consciousness as a computational phenomenon. His disinclination toward metaphysics notwithstanding, Shanahan's book can also be seen as supportive of a particular metaphysical stance on consciousness -the computational identity theory.
Bringing prediction explicitly into the explanatory picture (something that the book stops just short of doing) helps one understand not just the functional but also the computational and implementational layers of the proposed theory. Global mobilization is called for when prediction is likely to be particularly challenging. In such situations, the brain's global communications infrastructure "receives information from, and disseminates information to, numerous parallel processes operating on multiple levels, and thereby integrates their otherwise segregated activity. The integrative facility supplied by a global workspace gives rise to the conscious condition in general" (Shanahan, 2010, pp.68-69) . The pooling of all available resources does not just increase the chances of predictive success: only a unified approach to prediction is ultimately warranted. For a cat, aging or not, "it would be most disadvantageous for the head to predict one thing and the tail to predict another" (Llinás and Roy, 2009, p.1305) .
I perceive the theory put forward by Shanahan as complementing the analytical account of consciousness developed independently by Metzinger (2003) and Merker (2007) (for a synthesis, see Edelman, 2008, ch.9) . On the M&M account, conscious experience is defined by a number of functional attributes: perspectivalness, agency, ownership, and selfhood. For each of these, a computational theory has been offered and a likely neurobiological substrate identified (importantly, the latter involves vertebrate-standard subcortical structures such as the superior colliculus; Merker, 2007) .
According to M&M, the key functional component of the conscious state is a self-model -a virtual entity that the system constructs and puts in charge of guiding behavior, so as to concentrate the more important strands of decision making in a single computational bottleneck. Metzinger (2003, p.558) describes his model as a "total flight simulator," in which both the world and the pilot are virtual: "the brain, the dynamical, self-organizing system as a whole, activates the pilot if and only if it needs the pilot as a representational instrument in order to integrate, monitor, predict, and remember its own activities. As long as the pilot is needed to navigate the world, the puppet shadow dances on the wall of the neurophenomenological caveman's phenomenal state space. As soon as the system does not need a globally available self-model, it simply turns it off. Together with the model the conscious experience of selfhood disappears. Sleep is the little brother of death."
It is easy to imagine how the mechanism posited by Shanahan can provide Metzinger's virtual pilot (whose seat is in the superior colliculus; Merker, 2007) with integrated access to the entire wealth of informational patterns gleaned from past experience and encoded in the cortex (Merker, 2004) . But why does such integrated access necessarily distinguish cognition that is phenomenally conscious from cognition that is unconscious? Shanahan grapples with this question on p.112: "How does integration [. . . ] relate to phenomenology? The essential insight that answers each of these questions is this. Perfect integration occurs when the being as a whole is brought to bear on the ongoing situation."
One may object that this insight, while entirely valid, deflects the phenomenological question instead of answering it. Of course, this methodological move is fully in line with Shanahan's attitude toward metaphysics: "What does the present claim [. . . ] tell us about phenomenology? To begin with, we must reject the overly metaphysical conception of consciousness that insists on a precisely definable content to a subject's consciousness at any given time, and that the question of content always has an answer. Instead, we must accept that there is something of the refrigerator light illusion about our inner lives. [. . . ] If anything can be instructively said to be 'constitutive' of the conscious condition, it is the means by which the illusion is realized, the mechanism that switches on the light whenever the refrigerator door is opened, so to speak" (pp.114-115).
Given that a repudiation of metaphysics is in itself a metaphysical stance, I do not see what advantage it has over putting one's foot down and getting metaphysics to do some explanatory legwork for you (under strict supervision of science, of course). Warren McCulloch (1965) described just such a course of action in a paper titled Through the den of the metaphysician:
Maxwell, who wanted nothing more than to know the relation between thoughts and the molecular motions of the brain, cut short his query with the memorable phrase, "but does not the way to it lie through the very den of the metaphysician, strewn with the bones of former explorers and abhorred by every man of science?" Let us peacefully answer the first half of his question "Yes," the second half "No," and then proceed serenely.
The metaphysical stance on phenomenal experience that I personally favor is computational identity. Given that the mind is fundamentally computational (Edelman, 2008) , so is experience. This implies that experience is just as multiply realizable as, say, reasoning, and so is available in principle to computing machines other than biologically embodied brains. What makes a machine, biological or not, capable of experience? Because phenomenal experience cannot be a matter of attribution by an external observer, the relevant criterion must be intrinsic to the system in question. The Information Integration Theory (Tononi, 2008) , which, as Shanahan notes, is close in spirit to his version of the global workspace theory, is one candidate framework within which an intrinsic account of experience can be sought.
Another theoretical framework that fits the prior requirements is based on intrinsic topological properties of the system's activity-space trajectory dynamics (Fekete and Edelman, 2010) . A representational system whose dynamics gives rise to a parcellation of the space of its possible trajectories (so that certain regions of the system's activity space become excluded) constitutes a ready substrate for discernment, or categorization -arguably, the most fundamental property of experience. As the dynamics of such a system unfolds over time, the internal constraints that impose structure on the space of its possible trajectories get a chance to take effect. As Fekete and Edelman (2010) argue, this imbues the system's trajectories (but not instantaneous states) with intrinsic, system-internal meaning, singling them out as a possible vehicle of experience. 1 It makes sense to go all the way here and identify temporally extended trajectories through a complex representation space with experience. In science, equating a formally defined entity with one that is merely intuitively described has precedents, such as the Church-Turing Thesis (Copeland, 2002) , which declares effective computability (an intuitive notion) to be the same as Turing computability (a formal one). Resorting to a more mundane example, the metaphysical identity stance on conscious experience that I profess is akin to identifying dance with the ensemble of dancers in motion. What else could dance be?
Refusing to commit in this matter -as in saying instead "I don't know what dance is, but here's how you can tell if the event that's unfolding in front of you is it" -seems both unreasonable and counterproductive. We may guess where such reluctance comes from. Resistance to the metaphysical identity stance on the part of many brain/mind scientists, which often stems from their general aversion to metaphysics, is an unfortunate legacy of the historical tendency of the latter to play the role of Spanish Inquisition to science's free thinking. In the words of McCulloch (1965), Our adventure is actually a great heresy. We are about to conceive of the knower as a computing machine. That is not a new heresy. It has already been prejudged by Dryden in The Hind and the Panther, when he says And if they think at all, 'tis sure no higher Than matter, set in motion, may aspire.
I believe that he is correct, but I am not sure that that may not be high enough.
For my part, I am quite sure that the ongoing dynamics of a properly structured complex of activity-space trajectories is all there is to experience, and that therefore my inner life is the activity of my brain (cf. Metzinger, 2003, pp.58-59; Spivey, 2006, p.305; Edelman, 2008, p.488 ). Shanahan's book provides a useful characterization of the computational properties of this activity that make the realized experience more poignant -conscious -or less so.
